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The paper concerns production process innovation in an existing hybrid governance form. Adopting a Transaction Cost 
Economics perspective, we consider process innovation here in the conceptual context of the organization of production 
and technological change. It is assumed that the determinants of innovation act as emerging disturbances, and it is 
argued that innovation is achieved via adaptive, sequential adaptation based on specific, costly contractual rules. To 
support this thesis, the analytical framework introduces hypotheses to be tested by evidence. First, it is conjectured that 
the parties to a hybrid adopt flexibility techniques (MacNeil, 1978) to cope with the necessity of future process 
innovation. This hypothesis is compared with a competitive one, focusing the interests of the parties explicitly with 
regard to collaboration. Second, further hypotheses are tested that concern the influence of asset specificity, behavioral 
uncertainty and the allocation of resources to the costs of the contractual rules supporting innovation. A two-step 
method is proposed to test the hypothesis and to estimate the transaction costs associated with the contractual rules. The 
empirical results corroborate the analytical framework. Although this paper addresses a very specific issue, its main 
contribution relates to how hybrid governance forms organize production activities. 
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The organization of a production process through subsequent stages of activity entails vertical 
relationships based on specific governance mechanisms. Ménard (2004) includes supply chain 
systems and networks often designed and adopted by the agents in such cases among the hybrid 
governance structures. Hybrid governance possesses specific characteristics with respect to the 
market and the hierarchy (Williamson, 1991, pp. 279-281), and it is observable in a very large 
number typesof real-world organizational structures (Ménard, 2004; Grandori and Soda, 1995; 
Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Bruce and Jordan, 2007). Among hybrid forms, long-term contractual 
relationships are chosen by the agents because of the high frequency of the transactions and the 
asset specificity (Williamson,1991, pp. 283-285) and are employed in many sectors to support the 
governance of vertical relationships for the purpose of production process organization. More 
precisely, because of the hold-up problem, long-term contracts are often chosen (Joskow, 1985; 
1987; Crocker and Masten, 1991), even though the duration is not explicitly fixed (Battigalli and 
Maggi, 2008). However, the literature on hybrid forms offers a complex picture in which, beyond 
conflicts among the parties (Williamson, 1991), further organization factors are identified that 
motivate cooperation among them (Grandori and Soda, 1995; Powell, 1990). This study 
concentrates on process innovation within long-term contractual relationships, which are 
understood as a subclass of the hybrid structures identified by Williamson (1991) and adopted for 
the purposes of the governance of vertical relationships organizing production activities. A process 
innovation is “the introduction of a new method of production, that is one not yet tested by 
experience in the branch of manufacture concerned and that can also consists in a new way of 
handling a commodity commercially” (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 10). Blaug (1962) identified the search 
for efficiency gains as the determinant of process innovation. Theorists focusing on industrial firms 
(Penrose, 1963; Chandler, 1962) and, from a different perspective, scholars working on the 
management of production (Karlsson and Åhlström, 1997; Krajewski, Wie and Tang; 2005; 
Schmidt and Druehl, 2005; Davenport, 1993) have recognized several reasons for the necessity of 
process innovation. Process innovation entails several activities, including the design of patterns of 
productive operations and their operational implementation in the units in which the production 
process is articulated and organized (Davenport, 1993). Our view is that Transaction Costs 
Economics (acronym: TCE) provides the conceptual tools to address the organizational implications 
of process innovation. In TCE, technological issues are essentially conceptualized in relation to the 
“make or buy” problem structure (Williamson, 1985; 2005). This reflects the central tenet that 
technological and organizational modes are decision variables that are jointly determined 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 89). In this context, scholars have developed several analytical frameworks 
that converge to recognize the relation between technology creation and exploitation and the trend 
toward the centralization of governance (Oxley, 1997). Scholars have also highlighted the analytical 
importance of further dimensions of the organization of technology creation and exploitation, 
emphasizing the roles of cooperation and coordination (Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam, 2005; 
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Brockhoff, 1992) and of existing social structures (Arranz and 
Fernandez de Arroyabe, 2007). However, these approaches concentrate on the choice of the 
governance structure, with the exception of Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam (2005) and do not 
consider how existing hybrids cope with the necessity of innovating the production process. Our 
study instead pays attention to the organizational problem of how parties already engaged in an 
existing long-term vertical contractual relationship innovate in the context of the production 
process. It is important to address this problem if we are to enhance our understanding of how long-
term contractual relationships organize production. The solution we propose is that the process 
innovation in a long-term contractual relationship aimed at governing production, if it does not 
render the governance mode inoperable, is an outcome of a sequential adaptation based on specific, 
costly contracting rules. We furthermore contend that the basic contracting clauses adopted by these 
parties in order to coordinate themselves during the process of innovation implementation vary with 
the costs the parties expect to bear. More precisely, we argue that the parties adopt contractual rules 
designed to collaborate or to attribute to just one party the responsibility of managing the 
implementation stage depending on the sum of the associated transaction and production costs. As a  3
consequence, the process innovation can be thought of as an inducement to intensify the 
interdependence of the parties and to contribute to the centralization of the governance structure. 
This thesis is inferred from four specific premises that represent the reasons for our claim. The 
empirical analysis is intended to test our hypothesis with the purpose of integrating the theoretical 
evidence for the proposed reasons for our claim. Toward this end, we also introduce a two-step 
method of data analysis. Although we address a very specific issue, we contribute to comprehension 
of how long-term contracts organize production activities in the context of vertical relationships. 
Furthermore, we contribute to the TCE empirical analysis literature. Namely, the method we 
propose aims to address the difficulty of quantifying production and transaction costs (Williamson, 
1985, pp. 221-222) by providing separate estimates of the two types of costs. Finally, while many 
empirical studies adopt indirect approaches to measurement, our estimates of transaction costs are 
monetary. This paper is organized in two parts. The first part introduces the thesis with its 
supporting premises (section 2) and the rationale and method of the empirical investigation (section 
3). The second part of the paper (sections 4 and 5) provides empirical evidence supporting our 
arguments and is shaped by an analysis of data collected in the poultry sector, which provides an 
insightful example of the adoption of hybrid forms (Ménard, 1996). The last section includes some 
final remarks and possible lines of future research. 
 
 
2 Analytical framework 
 
2.1 Problem setting  
2.1.1 The context: TCE contributions to innovation analysis 
Scholars have explored the use of the category of transaction costs in the field of technological 
change based on several (in some case complementary) theoretical perspectives. In the following, 
we summarize some elements of the TCE approaches to technological change; we do not aim to 
provide a complete literature review, but rather to demonstrate that the contributions from TCE 
identify the nexus between technology creation and transfer and governance choice. Oxley (1997) 
delineates the category of appropriability hazards and shows how they determine a trend toward 
integration and that hybrid forms are chosen for both the creation and the exploitation of 
technology. Afuah (2001) argues that vertical integration in technology exploitation has a positive 
impact on firm performance. Analogously, Robertson and Gautignon (1998) investigate the factors 
determining the choice of a technology alliance, defined as a partnership between two or more 
independent companies that seek to leverage each other’s resources and competencies to develop 
substantial innovation. The authors point out the influences of asset specificity, frequency and 
uncertainty in determining the choice of a hybrid form to develop innovative activity. Gulati and 
Singh (1998) broadly explore the nexus between technology development and organizational 
structure, with a focus on the particular problems posited by technology in alliances. Namely, it 
appears to be difficult to circumscribe, monitor and codify the technology to be included within an 
alliance, and the parties tend to prefer centralized modes of governance (Gulati and Singh, 1998, p. 
789). Leiblein, Reuer and Dalsace, (2002) highlight the fact that a firm’s technology performance is 
contingent on the alignment between the firm’s governance decisions and the degree of contractual 
hazard. They found that a deviation in the alignment of the governance structure may have a 
detrimental effect on technological performance (Leiblein, Reuer and Dalsace, 2002, p. 830). The 
emphasis on the emergence of appropriability hazards sheds light on the need for contracting in the 
creation or transfer of technology (Mayer and Nickerson, 2005). Arranz and Feranandez de 
Arroyabe (2007) investigate the organizational issues emerging in the context of R&D networks 
and compare transaction costs theory and social capital theory from a complementarity perspective. 
Their study yields a complex picture in which the applicability of the technology is influential for 
the administration of the structures and the characteristics of the networks. The focus of this 
literature is on the choice of a governance structure in the face of the necessity of creating and 
exploiting innovation, and there is no direct explicit focus on the changes occurring at the 
production process level or on how they are organized in the context of a given governance 
structure. Two groups of central outcomes are reviewed in the literature. The first is that the  4
attributes of the transaction (asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency) influence the choices of 
agents and that the creation and transfer of technology involving various parties give rise to 
incomplete contracts and entail specific appropriability hazards, which, in turn, induce agents to 
adopt centralized forms of governance. The second outcome is drawn from the role of the social 
structure and emphasizes the influences of collaboration patterns (Gulati, 1998) and social capital 
(Brockhoff, 1992; Arranz and Fernandez de Arroyabe, 2007, Gulati and Singh, 1998). The 
transaction attributes are the analytical factors that have to be drawn from these contributions to 
approach the issues addressed in the present study. We take into consideration both the transaction 
attributes and the collaborative approaches in the development of the study. 
 
2.1.2 Problem setting: productive operations and the organization of production 
The problem we address concerns how long-term contractual relationships (Williamson, 1991; 
1995) organize production in the context of vertical relationships designed to produce goods and 
services. Structures purposely adapted to different aims – i.e., trade or, notably, R&D activities – 
are not the focus of the study. In other words, we consider only the process innovations that are 
internal to a given governance structure. The organization of production has been analyzed in terms 
of efficient organizational choices by considering how the stages of production are coordinated by a 
governance structure (Masten, 1984). Within this perspective, we consider the organizational level 
of the productive operations to be carried out within each stage.  
Oxley (1997) shed light on the fact that the transfer of a technology may entail intensive ex-post 
haggling costs and the failure of the original agreement. The transaction attributes thus determine 
the choice of an appropriate governance structure, leading the parties to mitigate the appropriability 
hazards. This approach does not fully explore two aspects of the situation that come to the light in 
the case of process innovation. First, it focuses on transactions whose objects are goods and services 
exchanged for the purposes of technology transfer. Second, Oxley (1997) implicitly assumes that 
the innovation taking place within a governance structure originally designed to pursue productive 
goals is analytically equivalent to the case in which the technology creation and exploitation require 
the choice of an appropriate governance structure. While the cases of technology exploitation and 
transfer are explicitly addressed, the sources of the hazards associated with the use of a technology 
subsequent to its transfer or exploitation are synthesized in the hazards posed by improper use by 
the recipient. We argue that, in the case of process innovation, ex-post haggling costs may arise at 
two distinct levels: at the moment of expressing a convergent assessment on the necessity of 
innovating and at the implementation stage. Furthermore, we identify four sources of specific 
investments associated with the implementation stages (see par. 2.2.3). To clarify the object of 
study, consider an abstract production process with just three productive operations—say, τ1, τ2 and 
τ3—to be carried out within two stages, each managed by a firm (supplier and buyer, respectively). 
Assume that at the time of establishing the governance structure, the parties agree to choose (τ1)’. 
Assume also that a new way of carrying out the operation τ1 in stage 1 then becomes available and 
is required for economic purposes —say, (τ1)’ denotes the old way and (τ1)’’ the new way. In the 
case in which the production is organized by the market, e.g., due to consumer expectations (Blaug, 
1962), the buyer recognizes the necessity of changing the technology in use, i.e., substituting (τ1)’’ 
for (τ1)’ to set adequate price incentives. The supplier may meet the new requirements, or another 
firm may enter into a relationship with the buyer. 
Case  c) concerns the internal organization of production. In the hierarchical case, the 
modifications are accomplished simply by exercising fiat, with the hierarchy being the “court of 
ultimate appeal” if a conflict arises regarding the necessity or the modalities of changes planned 
(Williamson, 1991, pp. 274-276). 
Case b) concerns the hybrid mode. In the broad situation depicted in Fig. 1, the buyer aims to 
induce the supplier to carry out (τ1)’’ according to his/her expectations. The implementation of the 
modification expected in stage 1 ((τ1)’ Æ (τ1)’’) could be directed by the buyer (as denoted by the 
dotted line in Fig. 1). For example, the buyer may negotiate the adoption of a production protocol 
by the supplier. The implementation could alternatively be either collaborative or performed by the  5
supplier, i.e., the firm managing the stage at which operations have to be innovated (a reversed 
picture would represent the case in which the change occurred in the stage managed by the buyer). 
 














            
There are technological and organizational reasons (Davenport, 1993) for such a choice, giving rise 
to the following problem: How do the parties to a long-term contractual relationship governing the 
subsequent stages of a production process accomplish the implementation of process innovation? 
While such a problem is at the root of process innovation implementation, it has not received 
sufficient attention in the organizational literature.  
 
2.2 Process innovation as adaptation 
The main thesis we argue in the following as a tentative solution to the problem described is that 
process innovation in a long-term contractual relationship aimed at governing production, if it does 
not make the governance mode inoperable, is accomplished by sequential adaptation based on 
specific, costly contracting rules. This claim integrates the analytical picture stemming from the 
TCE approach with technological innovation governance and recognizes the capacity of TCE to 
cope with the related issues through adaptation. Adaptation is the central problem of economic 
organizations (Williamson, 1991; 1995), and its conceptualization is integrated within 
complementary theoretical perspectives. Conditional on the attributes of the activities to be 
organized, Williamson (2005) focuses on the comparative efficacies with which alternative modes 
of governance effect good order (adaptation) during the ex-post contract implementation interval. In 
this architecture, adaptation is based on workable order-preserving mechanisms for adapting to 
disturbances in services yielding mutual gains and to the capacity of the parties to a long-term 
contract to incorporate hazard-mitigating mechanisms within the ex-ante contractual agreement 
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context of relational contract analysis (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002), contends that adaptation 
implies the ex-ante allocation of decision rights with the goal of coping with uncertain, ex-ante non-
contractible provisions and costly ex-post renegotiation. In a similar analytical context Arruñada, 
Garicano and Vàzquez (2005) point out that the assignment of decision rights in long-term 
relationships provides an opportunity to reduce the associated bargaining costs. Gulati, Lawrence 
and Puranam (2005) draw a different analytical perspective and conceptualize adaptation in the 
vertical relationship in terms of differentiation (concerning the state of collaboration among the 
units) and integration (concerning the state of the segmentation of the organizational systems into 
subsystems). They contrast the ability to promote coordinated and cooperative responses – based on 
differentiation and integration – with the adaptation pressures emerging in the transactions and task 
environment. Among others findings, Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam (2005,p. 436) stress the fact 
that adaptation in a vertical relationship entails both cooperation and coordination and places an 
emphasis on the role of bounded rationality. Ménard (2004; 2006) offers a generalization of the 
adaptation concept for the class of hybrid governance structures. He points out that the hybrids aim 
to reduce the costs of contract specification and to reduce the associated rigidities, thereby 
designing a relatively simple and uniform general relational contractual framework. In this context, 
adaptation clauses are crucial: they range from clauses requiring parties to remain in the 
neighbourhood of the original terms of the contract (e.g., index clauses) when a transaction involves 
weakly specified investments and/or uncertainty to clauses relying on flexible mechanisms to deal 
with highly specific transaction and/or consequential uncertainty (e.g., a clause delegating 
adjustment power to specific managers or arbitrators) (Ménard, 2006, p. 362). Our claim 
emphasizes adaptation as the central process allowing parties to carry out process innovation. In our 
view, this point of view contributes to the understanding of process innovation in TCE; thus, the 
relevance of our thesis is twofold: first, we contend that TCE provides an explanation for innovative 
changes not only at the level of the choice of governance modes to organize the process of 
innovation, but also at the level of innovative productive operations; second, we recognize the 
centrality of the adaptation process taking place in the ex-post contract implementation interval in 
response to the inducements arising within the process innovation steps. Our thesis is based on the 
following four premises: i) process innovation posits change necessities, which can be thought of as 
emerging disturbances of existing governance modes; ii) process innovation requires both technical 
and organizational changes; iii) process innovation requires adaptation; and iv) process innovation 
implementation determines variation in transaction and production costs. The structure of the 
argument we develop is proposed in Fig. 2. 
 











In the following, we develop these premises and derive some testable hypotheses. The results 
obtained provide evidence for our arguments beyond that derived from the existing literature. 
i. The necessity of modifying 
the production process can be 
thought of emerging 
disturbances. 
ii. Process innovation requires 
technical and organisational 
change 
iv. The process innovation 
implementation determines 
variation in the transaction and 
the production costs 
PREMISES 
iii. Process innovation requires 
specific assets 
THESIS 
In the long term contractual relationships dedicated to 
productive activities, the process innovation, if does not make 
the structure inoperable, is accomplished by adaptive, 
sequential adaptation based on specific, costly, contractual 
rules  7
2.2.1 The determinants of process innovation as emerging disturbances  
The determinants of process innovation have three characteristics that relate to the definition of 
disturbance in the sense of Williamson (1985; 2005). The first characteristic is that the parties 
cannot anticipate at the contract outset the entire influence of the innovation determinants nor the 
time at which appropriate responses can be determined. In other words, the parties cannot enumerate 
all possible contingencies associated with that influence or stipulate appropriate adaptations to them 
in advance. This reflects the intrinsic nature of the innovation, but also the uncertainty related to the 
production process (Ménard, 2006). A further source of uncertainty is represented by the need for an 
appropriate organizational environment within each productive stage (Davenport, 1993). Consider 
again the example proposed above: consumer expectations regarding the qualitative characteristics 
of the final product are usually satisfied by appropriate technological choices. Those expectations 
may change in ways that cannot be anticipated at the time of the original contractual arrangement. 
As a result, the parties will probably need to change their respective production methods—and this 
may, in turn, induce them to adapt their agreement to satisfy new demands. In contrast, the 
necessary change may be accomplished via a simple rearrangement of the supplier’s process; 
require an investment that will increase the mutual interdependence between supplier and buyer; or 
impose severe restrictions on the planning of joint activities (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Another 
relevant example is the case of modifications to technology promoted by a change in the basic “rules 
of the game”. For instance, a new law may constrain the degrees of freedom of the technological 
choices by requiring (or prohibiting) some specific method of carrying out productive operations 
(this case is treated in the empirical analysis; see pars. 3-4). In addition, in this case, the parties may 
be unable to anticipate the occurrence of the changes, in which case the change induced may require 
a modification of the arrangements related to technology. The second characteristic is that the 
necessity of innovating, if left unaddressed, could cause reductions in the mutual gains expected by 
the parties. For example, failure to satisfy the evolving needs of consumers may result in a persistent 
reduction of the net flows of the activities undertaken. A similar negative outcome would be caused 
by efficiency loss due to obsolescent productive operations. The third characteristic concerns the 
fact that both transaction and task environments determine “adaption pressures” (Gulati, Lawrence 
and Puranam, 2005). According to Williamson (1991; 1995), the conditions of technology influence 
the transaction environment. Analogously, as a strong interdependence exists between the activities 
of the parties to a vertical relationship, an arrangement of this nature exacerbates the pressures on 
the parties in all stages of the innovation process (Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam, 2005, pp. 422-
423). The study assumes that, given the existing governance structure, the reasons (e.g., efficiency 
gains, consumers’ expectations, institutional environment innovations) for innovating the production 
process can be thought of as emerging disturbances of the governance structure. This is a necessary 
logical premise to lead the theme of process innovation to the underlying theoretical constructs in 
the TCE context, namely to adaptation as a conceptualization of the reactions of the parties to foster 
the continuity of the relationships in the face of unforeseen necessities to enhance the production 
process.  
 
2.2.2 Process innovations and organizational change 
Our second premise is that process innovation is not reduced to the archetypical organized changes 
assumed in the study of laws of production. On the contrary, it is substantiated by multidimensional 
requirements that the agents must fulfill in terms of technological knowledge development and 
organizational decision making (Schumpeter, 1934; Davenport, 1993; Rosenberg, 1983). Innovation 
entails the design of new productive operations and of new operational patterns of activities 
(Davenport, 1993). It may also require new equipment and the development of new managerial 
approaches and human skills (Meyers, Sivakumar and Nakata, 1999; De Jong and Hippel, 2009). 
Therefore, the changes sustaining the innovation concern both the development of appropriate 
technological knowledge (Rosenberg, 1983; Tyre and Hippel, 1997) and the organization of the 
process in all stages involved. Hence, process innovation is achieved by designing and 
implementing both technological and organizational changes. This acts as a second logical and 
analytical premise because of the organization of the production required to deal with both technical 
and organizational issues (Williamson, 1985; Masten, 1984). A consequence of this premise is that  8
any technological change is associated with organizational change. As for the problem addressed 
herein, the point to be underlined is that the definition of productive operations is based upon 
technology and organizational decisions, and therefore, any process innovation requires 
organizational change. Namely, the association between technological and organizational change is 
relevant to our thesis because of a TCE statement: technology and organizational modes are 
decision variables whose values are simultaneously determined (Williamson, 1985, p.34 and p.89). 
More precisely, technology serves to delimit the feasible set, which mainly reflects transaction costs 
that economize the purpose (Williamson, 1988, p. 357). Therefore, if process innovation has both a 
technological and an organizational nature, it can be treated in the context of TCE conceptualization 
of decision making. 
 
2.2.3 Implementation and specific assets  
Beyond the desing, process innovation requires many implementation targets (see Chapter 9 of 
Davenport (1993), for a discussion) to be achieved through information gathering, technological 
knowledge creation and the realization of material and non-material artifacts. We consider four 
types of activities undertaken for the purpose of achieving those targets that involve specific 
investments:  necessity of design and make effective management relationships;  setting of 
information systems;  skills creation activities; and integration of users’ contributions. Process 
innovation can give rise to a bargaining process regarding the realignment of the original agreement 
because of the design and implementation of new activities entailing new tasks for the parties and 
new uses of their resources. 
a) Necessity of designing and make effective management relationships Athaide and Klin 
(2009) contend that the innovative process requires to set effective relationships management. They 
consider the impacts of behavioral and situational dimensions of new product development on the 
adaptation problem and empirically identify three basic approaches (seller-buyer, seller-guided, 
buyer-guided). Effective relationships are needed in the context of all of the steps of internal 
innovation to synthesize the parties’ vision of the process and purposefully organize the sequence of 
the steps. 
b) Setting of information systems. The necessity of setting information systems exists not only 
as a general way of setting information transmission mechanisms (Ménard, 2004), but also as a 
specific requirement in the context of innovative activities (Sobrero and Roberts, 2002; Hausman 
and Stock, 2003). Roy, Sivakumar and Wilkinson (2004) analyze the generation of innovation and 
emphasize the uncertainty affecting all of the involved activities. They argue that the link between 
the buyer-seller relationship and innovation generation is moderated by internal and external factors 
entailing knowledge creation and transfer (Roy, Sivakumar and Wilkinson, 2004, pp. 63-66). 
Because of the impact of information technology systems on innovation generation, buyer and seller 
are expected to invest in such systems, which are characterized by a high degree of specificity. Song 
and Theme (2009) focus on the impact of market information gathering activities (i.e., acquisition 
of information regarding lead users, customers, competitors and relevant policies) on 
commercialization and the predesign of both incremental and radical innovation. They find out an 
articulated picture about the signs of the impact of such activities on new product development 
(Song and Theme, 2009, pp. 52 ff.). Of note, they rule out the hypothesis that hybrid governance 
structures are adopted to carry out market information gathering activities. 
c) Skills creation. Meyers, Sivakumar and Nakata (1999) contend that four aspects of sellers’ 
characteristics are relevant to the implementation of process innovation: human resources, 
structures, the decision process and technology fit. As for human resources, scholars emphasize the 
influence of skills (Meyers, Sivakumar and Nakata, 1999, p. 298). Skills are outcomes of several 
complex processes entailing formal education, training and learning within an operational context. 
For example, the creation of an appropriate organizational environment is articulated in recursive 
steps from organization to technology levels (Davenport, 1993), which can be framed in terms of 
specific problem-solving. The parties must promote the participation of a number of individuals and 
groups – employers as well as managers – at several levels; this necessity may require changes in 
the assignment of tasks and also the development and implementation of joint commitments  9
designed to modify existing patterns of activities and interpersonal communication (Meyers, 
Sivakumar and Nakata, 1999, p. 304). 
d) Gathering users’ contributions. de Jong and von Hippel (2009) found that the process 
innovations most likely to be transferred to suppliers are those providing the most value to the 
innovating user and that transfer of innovation take place more easily if a relationship already exists 
between its users and producers. As users’ contributions to the process of equipment innovation are 
often highly valuable (de Jong and von Hippel, 2009, pp. 1183), the parties may be induced to 
maintain a closer relationship for the purpose of process innovation. Joint effects seem to favor the 
implementation process (Hausman and Stock, 2003). All of these activities are supported by 
investments which, while small relative to the transaction as a whole, are specific to the parties as 
related to the processes they manage and aim to innovate. This may give rise to costs arising 
because of the necessity of determining the distribution of the gain and because of temporary 
maladaptation (Williamson, 1991, pp. 278-279). The necessity of coping with these costs further 
motivates the parties to undertake the adaptation; therefore, the features of the implementation 
described provide support for our thesis. 
 
2.2.4 Determinants of the costs of contractual rules 
Changes in productive operations are arranged within the context of the contract relation 
characterizing the hybrid (Ménard, 2006). Questions thus arise regarding the costs of the 
contracting rule to be adopted as well as how the parties deal with the specification and 
implementation of the contractual rules supporting the adaptation. The parties to an agreement 
choose contractual rules by taking into account the costs associated with each rule (Brousseau and 
Raynaud, 2006). The modifications of the production process determine variations in both 
transaction costs and production costs as a consequence of the connection between the 
organizational and the technological changes. The technique-related contractual rules cause the 
emergence of ex-post  transaction costs (Williamson, 1995, p. 21), which take the forms of 
maladaptation costs incurred as the transaction drifts out of alignment and of haggling costs, which 
are caused by the bilateral efforts made to correct ex-post misalignment. First, the parties have to 
agree on the assessment of the necessity of innovating the process. If the assessments do not 
converge – due to lack of information or bounded rationality constraints (Gulati, Lawrence and 
Puranam, 2005) – the parties may bear the losses caused by maladaptation whether the necessity of 
innovation was caused by objective demand or institutional environmental forces. A costly 
negotiation could be undertaken to reduce the costs of the misalignment. Provided that an 
agreement is reached, further haggling costs must be borne to undertake the activities designed for 
implementation purposes (see par. 2.2.3). Based on Williamson (1995) and Brousseau and Raynaud 
(2006), we associate maladaptation and haggling costs in terms of the difference between the 
transaction costs associated with contractual rules. Maladaptation costs may emerge due to 
difficulties in ascertaining the quality input or output and in enforcing the agreement. For example, 
enforcement costs are caused by the possibility that the holder may find a new partner, while 
difficulties in ascertaining the quality of the inputs provided by the holder may emerge. 
Furthermore, because the recipient may use the technology in a way that was not intended in the 
contract (Oxley, 1997), some difficulties may arise regarding the monitoring of the effects of the 
operations performed. Each party will prefer one contracting rule over another depending on the 
size magnitude of these costs and their pattern with respect to asset specificity (Robertson and 
Gatignon, 1998) and (Williamson, 1996, pp. 110 ff.). TCE states that the attributes of the 
transaction (asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency) determine the sizes of the transaction 
costs. Therefore, we can formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: In process innovation organization in vertical long-term relationships, asset specificity causes 
variations in the ex-post transaction costs associated with the modification of a production process. 
 
On the other hand, Williamson (1995, pp. 59-60) states that uncertainty poses problems as 
exogenous disturbances arise and that as asset-specific investments and uncertainty increase, the 
occasions for sequential adaptation increase in number and importance. Scholars focus on the  10
distinction between environmental uncertainty (which relates to demand, technology and other 
factors surrounding the transaction) and behavioral uncertainty, which has a strategic nature 
attributable to opportunism (Williamson, 1995, p. 58). Many studies provide evidence for the 
existence of a positive relationship between the two kinds of uncertainty and vertical integration 
(Heide and John, 1990; Heide and Stump, 1995; John and Weitz, 1988; Saussier, 2000). Buvik 
(2002) analyzes the influences of the attributes of the transaction on the ex-post transaction costs in 
a hybrid structure and, according to TCE, finds that environmental uncertainty is positively related 
to these costs. Sutcliffe and Zaheer (1998) emphasize the necessity of accurately identifying the 
dimensions of the construct “uncertainty” and identify three types of uncertainty: primary, 
competitive and supplier uncertainty. Technology would be mainly affected by primary uncertainty, 
which reflects a lack of knowledge of the state of nature (John and Weitz, 1988, pp. 341-342; 
Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 1998, p. 3 and Krickx, 1995). A similar point is made by Balakrishnan and 
Wernerfelt (1986), who contend that uncertainty in technological fields should not favor vertical 
integration due to potential profit reduction. Our study deviates from this view for two reasons. 
First, our focus is on sequential adaptations and associates technology with appropriability hazards 
(Oxley, 1987). The distinction between environmental and behavioral uncertainty also comes to 
light in our study because if environmental uncertainty can be invoked with regard to technology, it 
can also determine the need to adapt, giving rise to the possibility that one or both of the parties will 
act strategically. Behavioral uncertainty that is connected to environmental uncertainty thus arises. 
This potential connection provides a further reason to focus on behavioral uncertainty in the case of 
the modification of the production process. We then assume that, in long-term vertical contractual 
relationships, the variation of the ex-post transaction costs caused by the modification of a 
production process is explained by behavioral uncertainty. 
 
H2: In process innovation organization in vertical long-term relationships, behavioral uncertainty 
causes variations in the ex post transaction costs associated with the modification of a production 
process. 
 
Of course, a further explanation exists supporting our claim: the variation in the production costs 
caused by the modification of a production process is explained by the variation in the use of 
resources. 
 
H3:  In process innovation organizationin vertical long-term relationships, the variation in 
production costs caused by the modification of a production process is explained by the variation in 
the use of the resources. 
 
2.2.5 The necessity to adapt 
TCE states that technological changes may render an existing governance structure inoperable 
(Williamson, 1988, p. 355). This phenomenon occurs due to cost differences related to comparable 
governance structures. For example, if these cost differences increase, the internal organization can 
become more convenient compared to the market because the current sum of the transaction and 
production cost differences reduces the level of asset specificity, making internal organization 
preferable. A change in technology may increase the costs of organizing production through the 
hybrid structure considered here; therefore, a technology change may make such a hybrid 
inoperable and promote the adoption of a hierarchy (Williamson, 1995, pp. 85 ff.). If the required 
change in the process does not give rise to such a consequence, the expected modification will be 
implemented through the adaptation of the existing structure. The adaptation process is based on 
adaptation clauses (Williamson, 1991; 2003; Ménard, 2006). We delineate two alternative ways to 
arrange this process: the parties may agree on delegating to one of them – e.g., by specificing the 
technical management committed (Ménard, 2006) – or may decide to collaborate in the face of the 
necessity to innovate. Broadly speaking, the hybrid modes are characterized by cooperative 
adaptation and by neoclassical contractual law, which facilitates continuity and promotes efficient 
adaptation (Williamson, 1991, p. 271) in the context of a relational contracting (Ménard, 2006). In 
cooperative adaptation, the need for coordinated investments and uncontested coordinated  11
realignments becomes frequent and consequential, and the parties make conscious, deliberate and 
purposeful efforts to craft adaptive internal coordinating mechanisms (Williamson, 1991, p. 279). 
According to neoclassical contractual law, in the hybrid context, the parties make efforts to create 
flexibility by means of several techniques (MacNeil, 1978, pp. 865 ff.). One technique is to allow 
one of the parties to the contract to define, directly or indirectly, the parts of the relation entailed by 
the innovations (One-Party Control of Terms, MacNeil, 1978). In our view, the One-Party Control 
of Terms acts as an adaptation clause consisting of attributing to the technical management of a 
party the faculty both to assess the necessity of innovating and to carry out the design and 
implementation steps. This also represents one aspect of the trend toward centralization caused by 
the adoption of hierarchical elements (Stinchcombe, 1985) within a more complex contractual 
framework. Such adaptation clauses are mentioned by (Ménard, 2006) and allow the parties to 
economize on haggling costs, potentially reducing maladaptation costs. Furthermore, they may 
decide ex-ante, for example, that the elaboration and design of the new production method will be 
the responsibility of the party recognized as more skilled and more experienced. One of the parties 
may have the opportunity to economize in the area of development and design because of the scale. 
The parties may also be interested in reducing the costs of the specification of contractual terms 
related to the design (Oxley, 1997). Critical aspects arise at the level of the management of the stage 
in which operations must be changed (see par. 2.1.2). The following testable hypothesis summarizes 
the analysis above: 
 
H4a: In vertical long-term contractual relationships, in the case of process innovation, the party 
managing the stage at which operations have to be innovated chooses as an adaptation clause the 
contractual term that admits One-Party control. 
 
The evidence concerning inter-organizational collaborative approaches to technological change 
introduces an alternative view. Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994) underline the importance of 
cooperative agreements in the context of the development of innovative activities and recognize the 
role of R&D cooperation in enhancing companies’ performance. Ahuja (2000) uses the social 
network approach to investigate the impact of the system of relationships upon innovative 
performance and emphasizes the importance of a collaborative environment. These results 
notwithstanding, the activities related to process innovation can be thought of as being composed of 
complex tasks, and as a result, the parties may face increasing cooperation costs (Gulati and Singh, 
1998) and (White, 2005, p. 1392;). These perspectives predict that an alliance will be either 
terminated or restructured if the cooperation costs exceed the benefits (White, 2005, p.1395). On the 
other hand, complying with the One-Party Control of Contract Terms may entail coordination costs 
(White, 2005; Mesquita and Brush, 2008) that reduce the benefits of running the transaction. 
Furthermore, Gulati and Singh (1998) emphasize the importance of the “social structures” resulting 
from prior interactions between partners in the choice of contractual forms. In essence, this 
principle indicates that prior interaction between the parties would support the decision on the 
choice of governance structure. It seems that there are no reasons to exclude the possibility that 
such a principle will also operate within an existing governance structure in which the continuity of 
the relationship is based on the parties’ mutual gains (Williamson, 2005). In other words, the parties 
already engaged in a governance structure develop a relationship that may contribute to the 
undertaking of the joint activities in the “ex-post contract implementation interval”. Support is also 
offered by the fact that the parties evaluate the benefits of future interactions and, according to 
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002), decide to cooperate if the benefits of this solution outweigh the 
immediate pay-offs of non-cooperative behaviors. A competing hypothesis can be drawn from this 
analytical perspective, namely that the contractual rules supporting the innovations of the 
production process reflect the preferences of the parties for collaboration, as collaboration reduces 
the influences of asset specificity and uncertainty on the transaction costs incurred by the innovating 
activities and also allows the parties to reduce both the cooperation costs and the direct costs of 
innovation. The empirical analysis is also designed to provide evidence supporting the first reason 
against the competitive hypothesis, which is expressed in the form of another testable hypothesis: 
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H4b: In vertical long-term contractual relationships, in the case of process innovation, the party 
managing the stage at which operations have to be innovated will choose as an adaptation clause 
the contractual term that supports the parties’ collaboration. 
 
The empirical analysis is primarily intended to test this hypothesis and thus to provide evidence 
supporting the fourth reason for our thesis. The structure of the hypotheses is summarized in Fig. 3.  
 


















In summarizing our argument we point out that the four premises discussed above (see figure 2) are 
intended as reasons to support our thesis, that is in the long term contractual relationships dedicated 
to productive activities, the process innovation, if does not make the structure unoperable, is 
accomplished by adaptive, sequential adaptation based on specific, costly, contractual rules. Some 
evidences for the reasons introduced have been drawn from literature, but the search for further 
evidences is in the focus of the empirical investigation. Actually, the hypothesis introduced are 
intended as evidences – conditioned to the outcome of the test – to our reasons, namely the premises 
iii) and iv) in the figure 2. The figure 3 underline the relations between the hypothesis and the costs 
of the adaptation clause. Therefore, while the reasons proposed provide supports to the thesis, the 
structure of the empirical investigation highlights the role of the transaction and production costs 
associated to the adapation clause allowing to undertaken the adaptation process. 
 
 
3 Empirical investigation 
 
The empirical investigation aimed to test the hypotheses introduced and to provide estimates of both 
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usually chosen by the agent and because the contracts accurately specify the technology and the 
domains of action of the processor and of the grower. 
 
3.1 Conceptual elements of the contract in the poultry sector 
The typical broiler contract includes meaningful details. The integrator firm provides animals, feed, 
medicine and advice to contract growers. Analyses of contracts in the poultry sector have mainly 
taken into account risk-sharing, incentive effects and technical changes (Knoeber, 1989; 1995; Levy 
and Vukina, 2004; Goodhue, 2000). Growers provide housing, utilities, labor and management and 
raise the animals owned by the integrator (Knoeber, 2000, pp. 1133-1134). Goodhue (2000) and 
Vukina (2001) suggest that the grower’s investment in specific assets (i.e., houses) can be thought 
of as an indicator of an agent’s ability. Ménard (1996) maintains that the specificity of the 
investment should not be considered influential. Vukina (2001) states that the main components of 
the contract are the division of responsibility for providing inputs and the method used for grower 
compensation. From a complementary perspective, Ménard (1996) points out the key role of 
growers, the variety of agreements and the nature of the contract as a general framework. Goodhue 
(2000) points out that the short-term legal contract is almost always renewed, creating a long-term 
implicit contract that has to be recognized as the expression of the true nature of the relationship. 
The periodic renewal of the short-term legal contract provides the integrator company with the 
necessary flexibility in the face of market changes (Vukina, 2001) but also allows the parties to 
specify contingent objectives and to address emerging issues. Thus, the hybrid contractual 
framework substantiates both the long-term relationship and the periodically written contract. The 
latter could also be thought of as a phase in a very long-term relationship, with growers’ preferences 
being at stake at both of these levels. 
The adaptation and related costs are connected to the degrees of freedom of the grower. Knoeber 
(2000) identifies the domain of action of the grower and indicates that the degrees of freedom are 
restricted to housing, utilities, labor organization and management. At any rate, some degree of 
freedom still exists in carrying out certain productive operations (e.g., the choice of disinfection 
method). 
 
3.2 Methodology of empirical analysis 
Let the i
th supplier gain a profit πi given the value of the final product PVi, the production costs Ci 
and the transaction costs TCi (Masten, 1984, pp. 404-405): 
 
ii i i π  = PV  - (C   +  TC )                       (1) 
 
The TCi depend on the characteristics of the transaction (asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency), 
while the Ci can be split into two components: C1i are the production costs that are not affected by 
the rule-setting at hand, and C2i are the costs that can vary with the contractual rules adopted: 
 
i1 i 2 i C  = (C   +  C )                           (2) 
 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the production function exhibits constant returns in the 
small range of input use implied by the approach. We obtain the following equation: 
 
2i i j ij
j
(C  +  TC ) =  β R  ∑                        (3) 
where Rij represents an appropriate index of the j
th rule by capturing the way producers carry out 
modalities of production executions regarding the i
th individual, while βj is the unit monetary value 
of the rule. Assuming that the unit value of the rule does not vary across the growers and that the 
contractual rules determine the variation only in C2i and TCi, we can directly consider the net value 
PVNi = PVi – C1i : 
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ii j i j
j
π = PVN  -  β R ∑                         (4) 
To test the coefficients βj that are interpreted in terms of C2i and TCi and to test the hypothesis 
introduced, we propose the method illustrated in Fig. 4. 
 















We adopt a Choice Experiment approach
1 that concerns the contractual attributes (Louviere, 
Hensher and Swait, 2000), assuming that the behavioral hypothesis of bounded rationality is not 
overly stringent in the case of poultry contracts (Ménard, 1997). This analytical assessment 
provides a basis for the validity of the approach chosen, even though the distribution of information 
and the respondent’s ability to manage it need to be taken into consideration (DeShazo and Fermo, 
2002; 2004). Let the utility due to a production contract be a linear function of the contractual rules 
(Bougherara and Ducos, 2006): 
 
cpi i j ij cpi
j
U= β + β R+ e ∑                        (5) 
where Ucpi is the utility for the individual i who chooses the contract c
th of the p
th set. We assume 
that a grower prefers the production contract c (utility level Ucpi) instead of the current contract 0 
(utility level U0pi) if: 
 
                                                 
1 The axiomatization of TCE does not include preferences as a necessary concept. On the other hand, preferences are implied in TCE 
at least under three different points of view: a) the three-level schema of Williamson (1996, p. 223) considers a role for preferences, 
even though he does this to point out that preference endogeneity is not the focus of TCE; b) preferences are at the core of the nexus 
between the search for minimizing transaction costs and the choice of contractual rules (Brousseau and Raynaud, 2006); c) 
preferences are considered by Ménard (2006) in the analysis of the authority in hybrid structures. 
Step 1: Choice experiment 
 
Procedure  
Analysis of the preferences of the party for the potential 
contractual rules concerning the process innovation 
 
Output 
-  Estimates of the total costs of the contractual change 
associated to the process innovation  (WTP/WTA for 
the contractual rules) 
-  Test of the hypothesis H1a and H1b 
Step 2: Regression analysis 
 
Procedure  
Analysis of the influence of the determinants (attributes of the 
transaction, indexes of production costs) on the total costs of 




-  Estimates of ex post transaction costs and  of  the 
variation of production costs 
WTP/WTA  15
( ) ( ) cpi 0pi i j cpij 0pij cpi 0pi
j
U- U= β + β R- R + e-  e > 0 ∑                     (6) 
 
Given equation (3), the differences in the utility of contractual rules in (6) correspond to differences 
in both C2i and TCi: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) j cpij 0pij 2cpi 20pi cpi 0pi 2i i
j
β R- R = C- C + T C- T C = ΔC+ ΔTC ∑                    (7) 
 
By combining equations (1), (7) and (8) we obtain: 
 
i i j cpij 0pij cpi 0pi
j
ΔU ββ (R R ) (e e ) =+ − + − ∑                      (8) 
 
In the second step, as follows, the WTA/WTP estimates are then regressed on specific determinants: 
 
2z Cz 1k TCk
z k
W= ω X+ω X ∑∑                       (9) 
 
where W indicates the WTA or WTP; XTCk and XCz indicate, respectively, the k =1,…, K 
determinants influencing the TCi; and z= 1,…, Z indicate the determinants of the C2i change. The 
estimated parameters ϖ1k and ϖ2k provide measures of the unit values of the determinants of the 
costs. 
 
3.3 Contractual attributes and cost determinants: measures and variable coding 
3.3.1 Contractual attributes 
A preliminary study was carried out to analyze the contractual relationship at the time when the 
management of the company was chosen. In that phase, the focus was on the general contractual 
attributes, the geographic distribution of farms, and the history of the company to define the 
relevant contractual attributes to be taken into consideration in the experiment. The modification of 
the production process was considered in the context of the main contractual attributes included in 
the short-term contract. The basic changes in the productive technique were introduced in this 
contract. Then, possible contracts were submitted to growers to elicit their preferences regarding 
contract attributes. The analysis concentrated on increasing process innovation in the institutional 
environment: since 2006, the European Union has banned the use of antimicrobial growth 
promoters (AGPs) to enhance the safety of the product. AGPs have several effects on the health of 
the animals as well as their productivity through mechanisms that are partially known. They 
represented a central input in poultry production, and the EU ban gave rise to widespread research 
activity to locate an appropriate substitute (Graham, Boland and Silbergeld, 2007; Dibner and 
Richards, 2005). Among the strategies explored is the search for better combination of the 
productive operation related to hygiene, acclimatizing and feeding. As a consequence, the new 
combination of such operations in the face of the elimination of the AGPs can be thought of as a 
process innovation. We investigate this point in the context of the search undertaken by companies 
at the end of the period of free use of the AGPs. The contract attributes chosen (Table 1) reflect the 
necessity of framing the potential innovation within a context that can be recognized as realistic by 
the respondents. 
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Table 1 
Choice set of contract attributes. 
Attributes  Level 1  Level 2  Level 3 
1) Contract length (years)  1  3  5 
2) Production cycle/year 









60,000 – 75,000 
3) Degree of autonomy  Autonomous 
 
In collaboration with the purchaser Only with direction of purchaser













a) Contract Length refers to the periodic written contract duration and was considered to 
examine the duration of the link between the grower and the processor company, which affects 
hybrid stability. The individual grower is expected to have an interest in a sufficiently long-term 
relationship. On the other hand, too long a duration should not be preferable because it may reduce 
the grower’s opportunities for improving the arrangements. 
b) Production cycles/year is a proxy for annual income intended to avoid bias in responses to 
questions directly concerning the amount of income. This variable was transformed into the variable 
INCOME by multiplying each value by the scalar 15,000 euro/year/farm. 
c) Degree of autonomy directly concerns hypotheses H4a  and H 4b.  The growers may be 
interested in shaping the organization and technology to meet individual goals that rely on the 
flexibility granted by the One-Party Control of Contract Term, or alternatively, they may be 
interested in collaborating with the purchaser. The hypothesis that the parties can adopt the One-
Party Control of Contract Term, corroborating hypothesis H4a, entails two possibilities: the growers 
may prefer to be completely autonomous or, conversely, completely dependent on the purchaser. 
Another possibility is that the grower may prefer to collaborate with the purchaser, corroborating 
hypothesis H4b (Fig. 5). 
 







d) Potential process innovation has been captured in the experiment by the attribute 
Disinfection  practices. Further productive operations are frequently involved in process 
innovation—e.g., in the field of animal feeding healthcare. Nevertheless, such types of operations 
are basically designed and managed under the domain of the action of the processor. According to 
the idea of One-Party Control of Contractual Terms, we interpret this contractual approach as an 
expression of the degree to which the growers are normally willing to assign to the processor the 
freedom to develop, design and assess these operations. Conversely, the operations related to 
disinfection practices can be managed under the domain of action of the grower. The limits of the 
domains of action can be thought of as being set via a long-term agreement in the sense of Coase 
Only with direction of 
the purchaser (PURCH) 
Autonomous 
(AUT) 
In collaboration with 
the purchaser (COLL) 
H4a 
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(1937, p. 391). In contrast, the disinfection practices represent critical elements in dealing with 
poultry production process enhancement. They can be changed according to several objectives—
e.g., the search for efficiency gains as well as the attempt to comply with quality strategy goals or 
legal constraints.  
e) Variable fraction of price was introduced to take into consideration the role of price risk 
(Hudson and Lusk, 2004; Allen and Lueck, 2004). The focus is on the price risk faced by growers 
with a short-term contract. There are three reasons for taking this risk under consideration in the 
context of our analysis. First, it is normally included in the short-term contract, and its presence 
allows the respondents to deal with realistic scenarios. Second, Williamson (1995) clearly states the 
difference between risk and uncertainty in the context of the transaction organization: the attention 
paid to behavioral uncertainty does not account for the risk that potentially affects the domain of 
action of the processor. Price formulas in the poultry sector are mainly concerned with the 
allocation of this kind of risk. Finally, in the context of the experiment, price risk is significantly 
linked to the potential efficiency gains associated with process innovation. A variable fraction of the 
difference between the average production costs and the costs of the individual grower is added to 
the basic level of the price. The larger the variable fraction of the price, the larger the portion of the 
efficiency gains caused by the grower’s actions that are really accomplished by the grower. The 
grower’s utility is a function of the contractual attributes previously mentioned. The design of the 
choice experiment is thus based on five attributes with three levels. This generates a full-factorial 
design that includes 3
5=243 possible contracts. Because this number cannot be handled in the 
experiment, a fractional-factorial design was created (Kuhfeld, Tobias and Garratt, 1994) that 
includes 54 possible contracts. These contracts were randomly distributed to obtain 18 choice sets, 
each including three choice alternatives.  
 
3.3.2 Cost determinants 
The next step is to choose the determinants of the transformation and transaction costs. Several 
indices of asset specificity are discussed in the literature (Robertson and Gatignon, 1998; Saussier, 
2000). We chose the total area of the poultry house as an index of asset specificity. In fact, a poultry 
house is the main investment made by the grower, and it is not easily allocated for alternative use 
for two reasons: a) the oligopolistic structure of the poultry industry makes it difficult for the 
grower to sign a new contract with a competing processor in the same area (site specificity); and b) 
it is very costly to modify the technological nature of the house (dedicated asset specificity). As for 
behavioral uncertainty, we concentrate on the fact that the uncertainty to be examined concerns part 
of the content of the relationship, namely process innovation. The related uncertainty seems to arise 
mainly from the difficulty in appreciating the outcomes of the innovation (Oxley, 1997; Robertson 
and Gatignon, 1998) and the intrinsic uncertainty of the transformation process (Ménard, 2006). 
Furthermore, we find that uncertainty exacerbates the influence of asset specificity. The 
questionnaire submitted included the technicians’ assessments of the ability of the grower to 
execute the production protocol. We assume that the higher the skill, the better the grower is able to 
cope with uncertainty. Transformation costs are based on a standardized technology and tend to 
vary mainly with the density of the animals per square meter. Thus, we use animals/m
2 as an index 
of the main production costs under the management of the grower. 
 
3.4 The sample and data description. 
Our empirical analysis was carried out in a large Italian poultry company chosen to be 
representative in terms of size, technology and marketing strategies. The Italian poultry sector is 
currently characterized by a few large companies managing more than 65% of marketed products, 
while less than 3% of the total units supply 90% of broiler production (Bagnara et al. 2004). These 
companies manage production by both direct engagement and production contracts. The chosen 
company has 5,500 employees, and total sales are about 700 million euro/year. The company 
produces 60% of all poultry supplied under vertical integration, with the remaining being managed 
by growers. To test our hypothesis, we used data from a questionnaire submitted in the summer of 
2005 to all 169 poultry growers linked to the company; 160 questionnaires were returned, and the 
total number of usable questionnaires was 121. We collected information at the grower level about  18
the characteristics shown in Table 2. Growers do not show a particular preference for the length of 
the contract, dividing their preferences equally among the three options. The average number of 
production cycles is about three; the growers rarely adopted five cycles or one cycle. Thirty-eight 
percent of the growers completely depend on the purchaser regarding organization and technology, 
while the remaining sixty-two percent collaborate with the purchaser. The following attributes 
represent production process tasks carried out according to each grower's wishes and his contractual 
liberties. In the sample, the shares of the three disinfection practices are almost the same, and a 
similar result is obtained for the variable fraction of prices. 
 
Table 2             
General characteristics of the sample (121 respondents)             
Variables Unit  Means  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max 
Contractual attributes  Levels                
Contract length  3 [1, 3, 5]  year  3.08  1.64  1  5 
Income   €/year  47851.24 15274.78  15000  75000
Production cycles  3 [1, 3, 5]  n/year  3.19  1.02  1  5 
Degree of autonomy:  3           
autonomous  
dummy
0.32 0.47 0  1 
collaboration   0.36 0.48 0  1 
direction of purchaser    0.33 0.47 0  1 
Disinfection practices:  3           
chemical  
dummy
0.32 0.47 0  1 
heat   0.34 0.48 0  1 
fumigation   0.34 0.47 0  1 
Variable fraction of price:  3 [0.2, 0.8, 1]  %  0.67  0.34  0.2  1 
Determinants of the transformation and transaction costs             
Size of the poultry house     m
2 3965.74  3800.22  1000  30200
Density of animals    n/m
2 19.57  8.65  15 46 
Skill of the growers             
(1 = poor; 2 = satisfactory; 3 = good; 4 = excellent)  ordinal 2.01  0.94  1  4 
 
The average size of a poultry house in the sample was 3,965.7 m
2. The mean stocking density is 20 
animals/m
2, but in more than 80% of cases, the density is less than or equal to 16 animals; only the 
largest farms use higher densities. Finally, the mean of the skill index is greater than 2, and 
technicians rated the ability of 25% of growers as good or excellent. 
 
 
4 Empirical findings 
 
4.1 Econometric results 
We estimated the coefficients βi and βj of equation (8) via a conditional logit model. In reference to 
(5), we employed the following specification and tested the homoscedastic assumption to analyze 





choice = *  + *  +  *  +  *  +
                   +   *  +  *  +  * + e
len inc aut
qp




             
(10) 
 
Table 3 illustrates the model estimates and the basic econometric results
3. 
                                                 
2 In our model, first, we assume that the error variance is constant across growers. Then, following Hensher, Louviere and Swait 
(1999) and DeShazo and Fermo (2002; 2004), we adopt alternative models that allow for unequal variances across growers. Because 
we have only 363 observations, we follow Holes’ advice (2006) regarding several tests to check heteroskedasticity; this is because 
the tests are equivalent only from an asymptotic point of view, while they provide different information for a small sample. Overall, 
one LR test and three versions each of the LM and Wald tests are considered. None of these tests rejects H0 (homoskedasticity); the 
results are available upon request. 
3 The three contractual alternatives are ‘equivalent’ in terms of the exit option. A Hausman test was performed simply by excluding 
the first alternative in each choice set. The test (χ
2=2.74(0.84)) indicates that the IIA hypothesis is not rejected, so from an economic 
point of view, the hypothesis of the heterogeneity of preferences could be taken into account directly (Hudson and Lusk, 2004).  19
 
Table 3   
Conditional logit regression models and WTP-WTA computation.   
Variable Parameter 
(A)  Sample  
estimate 
(1) 
(B) WTP-WTA   
Bootstrap computation 
(2)  
LENGTH  βlen  -0.8156 ***  3668.660  *** 
    (0.1789)    (780.196)   
INCOME  βinc  0.0002 ***     
    (0.00004)      
AUT  βaut 0.8364  *  -3762.105  ** 
    (0.4569)    (1577.825)   
PURCH  βpur -0.9337  ** 4199.818  ** 
    (0.4051)    (2055.882)   
AIR  βair -3.4301  ***  15428.510  *** 
    (0.9417)    (3452.260)   
HEAT  βheat  -2.6446  *** 11895.430  *** 
    (0.8197)    (2926.944)   
QPRICE  βqp  -0.0583   262.466   
      (0.6522)     (3066.741)    
(1) LHS = choice, n = 363; LL = -35.418; LR χ
2
(7) = 195.03; Pseudo R
2= 0.734. 
(2) LHS = choice, obs. 363, bootstrap rep. = 1089; e.g. E[WTPLENGTH]   =  - βlen / βinc 
Significant at *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%. Standards errors in parentheses 
 
The LENGTH coefficients indicate that growers rely on the possibility of periodically improving the 
contractual arrangement. The INCOME coefficient estimated is positive and statistically significant, 
supporting the hypothesis that expectations regarding income contribute to shaping the growers’ 
preferences regarding contracting. The effects codes are highly significant. Dummy variables 
related to disinfection practices are significant as well. The results for the attribute QPRICE show 
that the risk coefficients suggest that a role for price risk does not exist in our sample. Table 3 
illustrates the estimated WTP and WTA derived from the estimated coefficients. The parameters are 
calculated from 1089 draws from the sample. For each draw, standard deviations and probabilities 
were estimated. Analogously, the WTP for introducing HEAT  and AIR disinfection practices 
indicates that changes in the production process are related to transformation and transaction costs. 
On average, the grower prefers to adopt the disinfection practice proposed as a modification of the 
production process. The second step of the analysis was carried out by considering the whole WTP 
and WTA estimated for the scenario chosen by each individual. These were interpreted according to 
equations (7) and (8). The whole WTP and WTA were then regressed on the determinants of the 
transformation and transaction costs. We introduced an index obtained from the multiplication of 
AREAS by SKILL, and we expect the index to be negatively correlated with the transaction costs. 
Furthermore, a dummy variable (SCALE) marks the four largest poultry houses. We will now detail 
the specification of a cost function that splits the total cost into transaction and production costs in a 
way consistent with the literature; this function can be consistently estimated by quantile regression 
(QR)
4 (Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Koenker, 2005), which is critical to answering the question of 
how significant determinants impact costs. Table 4 and Fig. 6 show the main results obtained via 
OLS and QR estimation. All of the coefficients are strongly significant in accordance with the 
second hypothesis. The results are quite different if we analyze the cost function across quantile 
distributions; all of the estimate parameters except SCALE are significant between the second and 
third quartiles. AREAS is highly significant in the first quartile too; AREAS*SKILL is significant at 
10% in the 85
th percentile, while in the same percentile, DENS is highly significant. 
  
                                                 
4 The principal benefit of the QR approach over OLS is that it does not constrain the coefficients to be identical at every point in the 
distribution of the dependent variable like OLS does. In this paper, we use the quantreg (Koenker, 2009) and SparseM (Koenker and 
Ng, 2009) packages for R statistical software.  20
 
Table 4          
Regression estimates, LHS = WTP-WTA.       
Variables Parameter  OLS  QR QR QR 
0.15 0.25 0.40 
AREAS  βare  1.999 ***  0.077  1.315 **  2.187 *** 
   (-0.476)  (-0.755)  (-0.642)  (-0.573) 
AREAS*SKILLS βask  -0.574 **  0.044  -0.421  -0.535 * 
   (-0.242)  (-0.448)  (-0.411)  (-0.318) 
DENS  βden  460.301 ***  219.639 *  260.810 *** 289.262 *** 
   (-76.241)  (-120.140)  (-85.536)  (-55.218) 
SCALE  βsca  -25690.021 *** -7591.442  -18710.240  -29086.451 * 
   (-8050.011)  (-13064.081) (-15685.049) (-15099.841) 
Ps-Rsq     ---  0.189 0.262 0.382 
Adj-Rsq   0.661  ---  ---  --- 
Variables Parameter 
QR QR  QR  QR 
0.50 0.60  0.75  0.85 
AREAS  βare  2.207 ***  2.534 ***  2.057 *  1.374 
   (-0.702)  (-0.872)  (-1.126)  (-1.218) 
AREAS*SKILLS βask  -0.461 *  -0.577 *  -0.236  -0.623 
   (-0.271)  (-0.346)  (-0.549)  (-0.603) 
DENS  βden  336.180 ***  441.314 **  842.120 *** 1351.146 *** 
   (-124.410)  (-196.357)  (-239.284)  (-270.631) 
SCALE  βsca  -32327.702 *  -39590.661 * -34168.952  -10654.590 
   (-19030.259)  (-21454.321) (-27537.809) (-24972.581) 
Ps-Rsq    0.436 0.508  0.585  0.622 
Adj-Rsq     ---  ---  ---  --- 
Significant at *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Quantile regression and OLS estimate parameters. 
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Finally, we check whether the conditional quantile functions have the same slope parameters. 
Following the test strategy suggested by Koenker and Bassett (1978), we find that slope parameters 
do not jointly or singularly differ across the distribution. 
 
4.2 Discussion 
The first step of the method proposed provides evidence for the first two competing hypotheses. 
The contractual scenarios including the hypothesized process innovation (Disinfection practices) 
were consistently taken into account by the growers. This outcome confirms the idea that 
innovation is supported by specific contractual rules, an idea that, in turn, was also confirmed via 
the preliminary investigation at the technician and management levels. The coefficients of AUT and 
PURCH are informative in terms of the two competing hypotheses H4a and H4b
5. The model 
illustrated is based on effect codes: the coefficients show that the growers prefer the full degree of 
autonomy (AUT) with respect to the mean of the response variable and do not prefer to develop 
innovation under the exclusive direction of their processor (negative coefficient for PURCH). This 
outcome indicates that the One-Party Control rule should not entail a role for the processor. We also 
ran a model with contrast codes for AUT and PURCH using “collaboration” as a base level. In this 
case, the coefficients were 0.4297 (significant at 6.9%) and -0.4808 (significant at 12.4%). 
According to Fig. 3, the findings indicate that autonomy is preferred by growers over collaboration, 
while the latter is preferable to “direction of the processor”, which is surely not preferred. Similar 
outcomes are obtained by estimating a model with dummy codes. As “autonomy” expresses the 
One-Party Control of Contractual Terms rule, we conclude that hypothesis H4a has to be accepted 
and that there is weak evidence for the need to reject hypothesis H4b. In contrast, the evidence 
supports collaboration only as compared with “direction of the processor”. We interpret the rank of 
the preferences in terms of transaction and production costs; nonetheless, the particular nature of the 
adaptation at stake indicates that the collaboration allows the parties to economize on cognitive 
resources (Ancori, Bureth and Cohendet, 2000), especially in the context of the implementation of 
new technological knowledge, which also relies on interactions between agents and instruments 
(Penrose, 1963). The argument and the evidence provided by (Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam, 
2005) make clear that the incentive conflict and the bounded rationality are closely intertwined 
within an adaptation process in alliances. Our findings suggest that the conflict incentive becomes 
prevalent in the case of process innovation with a role for the transaction attributes. The Oxley 
(1997) analysis seems to support this point. Nevertheless, we see that, in the case of collaboration, 
the supplier would hold, at least partially, the direction of the implementation while integrating the 
operational patterns of the technological knowledge of the buyer. The second step in our method 
provides evidence for the remaining hypotheses. The coefficient of AREAS has the expected sign 
and indicates that the incidence of asset specificity accounts for 57% of the sum of the transaction 
and production costs. This influence is reduced, as expected, by the grower’s SKILL level (-17.7%). 
These outcomes corroborate both hypotheses H1 and H2. Hypothesis H3  is also corroborated 
because the coefficients for DENS and for SCALE have the expected signs. The results of the 
quantile regression indicate that asset specificity is increasingly influential as the costs increase, 
while the opposite is true for skills. Analogously, the influence of the variables accounting for 
production costs decreases with the increase of the total costs. It seems that these outcomes reflect 
the nature of asset specificity, uncertainty and of the scale economies. Finally, the OLS model 
indicates that the transaction costs account for 40.1% (2131.62 €) and the production costs for 
59.9% (3184.13 €) of the total costs associated with process innovation. This supports the analytical 
proportions proposed by Williamson (1995). 
  
                                                 
5 We decided to investigate the preferences of the respondents by comparing the three possibilities considering three alternative codes 
(Cohen and Cohen, 1983), dummy, effects or contrast, for the attribute Degree of autonomy to account for the possibilities 
mentioned.  22
5 Final remarks 
 
The category of hybrids is very complex in nature, and its analysis brings to light many crucial 
issues conceptualized in alternative or complementary theoretical perspectives (Ménard, 2004; 
Grandori and Soda, 1995; Bruce and Jordan, 2007). The study addresses the specific problem of 
how parties already engaged in a long-term contract may cope with the necessity to innovate the 
production process. Our thesis is that process innovation in a long-term contractual relationship, if it 
does not render the structure inoperable, is an outcome of sequential adaptation based on a specific 
contractual rule and contractual flexibility techniques. The choice of the contractual rule is 
influenced by the variation in the transaction and production costs associated with the rule. The 
study underlines the fact that process innovation entails conscious efforts of the parties that 
converge to craft the adaptive internal coordinating mechanisms characterized by centralized 
activities intended to steer process innovation. The long-term relationships examined in the 
empirical analysis engage the parties in subsequent short-term contracting steps which could specify 
contractual clauses that are useful to cope with the necessity of adaptation. We ranked the 
contractual rules based on our evidence and found that an adaptation clause based on one-party 
control would be preferred by the party managing the stage directly involved in the change. This 
also reflects the possibility of including hierarchical elements within the contract (Stinchcombe, 
1985), corresponding in our case to the Coasian limitation of the domain of action (Coase, 1937) of 
one party. On the other hand, it appears reasonable to recognize the partial preference for 
collaboration. Based on the literature, we contend that this is a consequence of the prior interaction 
undertaken within the existing relationship. The interaction would activate collaboration, but for the 
purpose of further integrating parties’ patterns of actions – those associated with the innovation – 
within the existing governance. Both types of contracting clauses induce a closer relationship 
between the parties, reflecting the general trend toward centralization promoted by innovation 
activities (Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam, 2005). Two opposite paths sustain the process: accepting 
the direction by just one party or requiring collaboration. The main limitation of this study is due to 
the difficulty of providing a more detailed investigation of process innovation in the empirical 
context. We consider just one potential change in productive operations, whereas a number of 
operations are likely to be involved in many cases of innovation. In addition, because the 
respondents are aware of the fact that no change was really being promoted in the experiment, there 
is incomplete certainty concerning the assessments proposed. Our research does not deny that 
collaborative activities take place in the context of hybrid governance as well as in the field of 
technological change, which has been demonstrated by several research streams. Future research 
may investigate what relation, if any, exists between the functions of these hierarchical elements 
and the nature of the contractual rule. 
   23
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